Post #1
The Division of Korea, 1945-1948
Dr. Kathryn Weathersby
The most fundamental and tragic fact of modern Korean history is that its liberation from Japanese rule in 1945 was immediately followed by its division into two hostile states. This tragedy was unexpected by all parties involved. It is difficult to understand how and why it happened because the countries that brought it about – the United States and the Soviet Union – did not intend or desire such an outcome. There is therefore no simple narrative that explains how and why Korea was divided. Nonetheless, if we are to understand why the war of 1950-53 came about, we must begin by examining how the precondition for that conflict – the division of Korea – happened.
Over the next several posts, I will attempt to explain how the aims, perceptions, and actions taken by the two powers that occupied the peninsula in 1945 resulted in the creation of separate states in 1948. The first circumstance to note is that the initiative for allied decisions on postwar Korea came from the United States because it was the US that played the dominant role in the war against Japan. The British left Southeast Asia after Singapore fell to Japan in 1942, and since their war against Germany required all possible resources, they did not return to East Asia until after Japan was defeated. The French similarly were in no position to contribute to the war in the Pacific. The military forces of Nationalist China, as well as those of the Chinese Communist Party, certainly fought against Japanese troops in China, and their ranks included several hundred Koreans who fought under Nationalist command and many thousands who fought with the Chinese Communists. However, neither Chinese army was a modern, industrialized fighting force. Consequently, while Chinese and Koreans played an important role in engaging substantial Japanese forces, they were not able to defeat their enemy.
It was thus left to the Americans to play the dominant role in defeating Japan, once the US entered the war following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. Washington tried to get help right away from the Soviets, who had a land border with Manchuria and Korea and were now fighting on the allied side since Germany invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. However, like the British, the Soviets had to devote all their strength to resisting the powerful German assault. Moscow therefore rebuffed American appeals to join the war against Japan and instead held scrupulously to the neutrality pact it had concluded with Tokyo two months before Germany attacked. The Soviets naturally regarded it as essential that they not fight a war in the East until after their war against Germany was finished.
Moscow was so afraid of giving Japan an excuse to attack that it declined to join the first allied discussions about a postwar settlement in the Far East, which were held in Cairo in November 1943. At that meeting, the UK, US, and Republic of China agreed that once Japan was defeated, Korea would “in due course” become free and independent. The allies made no further clarification of the postwar settlement in East Asia, however, until they met again in the Crimean resort of Yalta in February 1945, when the defeat of Germany was imminent.
By the time of the Yalta conference, US President Franklin Roosevelt had worked out his ideas for how to accomplish his main objective: creating means by which the nations of the world could avoid the outbreak of a third world war. World War I had been called “the war to end all wars,” but just 21 years later an even more destructive global conflict had begun. As the leader of the country that would emerge from the second world war with overwhelming dominance economically and militarily, Roosevelt felt it was his responsibility to create postwar agreements and structures that could prevent a third conflagration. Establishing the United Nations Organization was fundamental, as it would provide a structure within which all member states – large and small – could cooperate to resolve conflicts peacefully.
In addition to the UN, Roosevelt planned to create separate cooperative structures for certain areas of the world that would be liberated from German, Italian, or Japanese rule. Unfortunately, Korea was one such place. Roosevelt was keenly aware that in recent decades the powers surrounding Korea had fought over control of the peninsula – the Sino-Japanese War of 1884-85 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. The president therefore concluded that the defeat of Japan would lead to a new conflict over Korea, this time between China and the Soviet Union. To avoid such an outcome, Roosevelt proposed to Soviet leader Joseph Stalin that they establish an international trusteeship, together with the Chinese and the British, that would enable the wartime allies to cooperate in the creation of a new government for Korea.
Of course, once the war ended it quickly became clear that there would be little cooperation between the Soviets, on the one hand, and the British, Americans, and Chinese Nationalists on the other. Moreover, the idea of trusteeship ignored the will of Koreans, who naturally assumed that they would themselves establish a new government for their country. Roosevelt underestimated the inherent conflict between the Communist and Capitalist allies and grossly ignored the wishes and capabilities of Koreans. The trusteeship idea created the foundation for the division of Korea, a process we will turn to next, and is therefore justly condemned as a tragic example of great power chauvinism and hubris. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that the plan to create a trusteeship for Korea arose from Roosevelt’s desire to avoid a third world war, not from an intention to establish American control over the southern half of the peninsula.
This page is synchronized from the post: ‘(Korean War History) post # 1, The Division of Korea, 1945-1948’