by Prof. Kathryn Weathersby
In the report on conditions in the northern zone that he submitted in June 1946, which was discussed in the previous post, Truman’s representative Edwin Pauley described considerable enthusiasm for Soviet policies. In fact, the successes of the Soviet occupation continued through the rest of that year. Following land reform, in the summer of 1946 Soviet authorities implemented labor laws that guaranteed the full range of socialist protections for workers. Koreans living in the northern zone now had the right to membership in trade unions, an 8-hour working day, compensation for injuries on the job, and safety and health protections. In addition, Soviet-style social organizations created for peasants, students, and women provided paid vacations and a host of activities for leisure and education. Finally, in August industry was nationalized. Since nearly all industries were owned by Japanese companies or individuals, this measure meant that wealth was transferred from the former oppressor to the proto-state in the North, a highly popular policy.
Conditions in the southern zone, by contrast, were becoming more and more desperate. Food shortages and fears of hoarding prompted the American authorities to begin confiscating grain. At the same time, harsh labor policies led to the “October People’s Resistance,” which began with a railroad strike in Pusan then spread to Daegu and Seoul. These labor protests joined those of peasants who were resisting forced grain collection, and the resistance spread throughout the southeastern provinces. Violence was mostly directed against police, many of whom had served the Japanese and were now carrying out hated policies of the Americans. Protestors killed more than 400 policemen, using a level of brutality that shocked the American soldiers who were called in to restore order.
We do not yet have full records from Russian archives of how Soviet officials guided and financed Korean Communists’ involvement in the violent protests of October 1946. We do know, however, that Soviet authorities in the North were responsible for advancing the position of leftist groups in the South and were diligent in carrying out this role. In light of this situation, General Hodge reported to Washington in October that he expected a Soviet-sponsored invasion of the South within six months and that US forces would not be able to prevent a reunification by force.
Hodge therefore asked the Pentagon for additional troops and for permission to strengthen the rightist youth groups, which he saw as essential to maintain order. He vented his despair in a personal letter to Secretary of War Patterson, in which he explained that “Koreans want their own country to themselves and…the Russians are constantly infiltrating their highly trained and indoctrinated agitators into our zone to take full advantage of every possible point in the low level economic situation that can cause discontent…the international flavor is becoming heavy and there can be no question as to the worldwide push of Communism with the main all-out effort now directed against the United States. I hope our nation wakes up before we become too saturated with the Soviet brand of democracy.”
Hodge reported to the War Department in early 1947 that the economic crisis caused by inflation, power shortages, and food shortages was discrediting the American Military Government and prompting violence. He urged Washington to abandon its commitment to negotiating with Moscow to create a new government for Korea. This policy, he argued, was only leading to discouragement and low morale among the people of the American zone.
Washington ignored Hodge’s warnings, however. The State Department continued to hope for a resumption of the Joint Commission. In light of discussions it was carrying out with Moscow over a vast range of territories in Europe, the Near East, and Asia, the State Department wanted to avoid any indication that it preferred confrontation over negotiation regarding Korea.
Aware of the Soviets’ geographical and political advantage in Korea, an American diplomat argued that the US position in Korea “is clearly hopeless unless cooperation with the Russians can eventually be achieved. Unilateral action must be presented as a short-run course which has been forced upon us. Our program, it should be emphasized, is a means of demonstrating to the USSR that cooperation is desirable.” Korea would gain its independence and a democratic government, in the view of the State Department, only if Washington demonstrated a firm intention to fulfill its commitments and a willingness to cooperate with Moscow.
In the next post, we will examine the resumption of the Joint Commission meetings in the fall of 1947 and the consequences of its failure.
[Sources: This post relies again on James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (University of Hawaii Press, 1985). It also relies on John Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War (University of Delaware Press, 1989).]
This page is synchronized from the post: ‘(Korean War) The Division of Korea, 1945-1948. Post # 21’