Prof. Kathryn Weathersby
The spring of 1946 saw the rise of political assassinations and other violence in the southern zone, which led American officials to fear that the adjournment of the Joint Commission would lead to civil war in Korea. William Langdon, political advisor to General Hodge, urged Washington to reach an agreement with Moscow to mutually withdraw occupation forces by early 1947. The State Department, however, decided to hold firm. President Truman had adopted a new policy of “patience with firmness” toward the Soviet Union, spurred by concerns about Soviet occupation policy in Eastern Europe, its failure to withdraw troops from Iran, and its threatening actions toward Turkey. Accordingly, Secretary of State Acheson informed American officials in Seoul on May 18 that the US would not resume meetings of the Joint Commission until Moscow recognized the principle of freedom of expression. In other words, as long as the Soviets refused to allow consultation with political groups that had opposed the Moscow agreement, the Americans would continue to boycott the Commission.
Acheson believed, unrealistically, that Stalin would be forced to accept American terms once Moscow’s position toward the Joint Commission turned Koreans against the Soviet Union. Other American officials more realistically concluded that the self-governing institutions the Soviets had established in the North made the US military government in the South look worse by comparison. To remedy this problem, the State/War/Navy Coordinating Committee in Washington instructed the American occupation command to hold elections for organs of limited self-government. Langdon was encouraged by this change of policy, arguing that “the Soviet strategy depended on American frustration and eventual withdrawal opening the way to a Communist seizure of power. Through unity, patience, and resolve, however, the US could foster the emergence of a strong, independent, democratic coalition and thereby thwart Moscow’s plan.”
In June the resolve of US officials in Korea was bolstered by the report delivered by Edwin Pauley, Truman’s representative to the Allied Reparations Commission. Pauley traveled to northern Korea in late May to investigate reports that the Red Army was dismantling Japanese-built industries and shipping valuable equipment to the Soviet Union. Since the allies had not yet reached agreement on Japanese reparations, such removals were regarded as illegal confiscations. Pauley inspected numerous industrial sites and reported that the Soviets were not, in fact, carrying out such seizures. Instead, they were restoring the substantial industrial capacity of northern Korea. This was not necessarily good news for the US, however, as such efforts indicated, in Pauley’s view, that the Soviets intended to stay in Korea until their “puppets” were in complete control.
In his report, Pauley urged the US to pay more attention to Korea, arguing that it was “an ideological battleground upon which our entire success in Asia may depend.” Specifically, he warned against making any concessions to Moscow, since the loss of Korea would endanger the security of Japan. Pauley proposed that the US begin a campaign to inform Koreans about Soviet violations of existing agreements regarding the peninsula and to promote the advantages of democracy, in the American meaning of the term. Having seen the enthusiastic response of Koreans in the North to Soviet efforts to provide educational opportunities and improve general welfare, he urged that the US send economic aid, teachers, and technicians to its zone. Unless the US met popular needs and desires, he warned, the Soviet Union would eventually dominate Korea. President Truman responded positively to Pauley’s report and immediately arranged a meeting with Secretary of State Byrnes to reassess American policy in Korea.
That same month, the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, John H. Hilldring, reported that the stalemate in the Joint Commission was “the result of a clash between United States insistence upon respect for the principle of freedom of speech and Soviet determination to prevent certain avowedly anti-Soviet Korean leaders from participation in the Provisional Korean Government. These leaders constitute a group of older “émigré” Koreans who have returned to Korea since the capitulation of Japan. They are not thought to be completely representative of Korean political opinion, nor are they felt to be essential to the establishment of Korean democracy or the attainment of US objectives in Korea. On the other hand, their presence on the political scene greatly increases the difficulty of reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union.” Hilldring urged the American Military Government to resume the work of the Joint Commission, under the unrealistic belief that Korean enthusiasm for participation in political affairs would force Moscow to recognize the principle of freedom of expression.
In the next post, we will continue to trace the steps that led to resumption of the Joint Commission in 1947.
[Sources: This post relies heavily on James Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (University of Hawaii Press, 1985); His account cites Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume VIII; Edwin W. Pauley, “Survey of Resources in Manchuria and Korea and the European Reparations Program,” Department of State Bulletin 15 (August 4, 1946)]
This page is synchronized from the post: ‘(Korean War)The Division of Korea, 1945-1948. Post #20’