Prof. Kathryn Weathersby
The Joint Soviet-American Commission created by the Moscow Conference agreement on trusteeship was to begin work in Seoul on March 30, 1946. To prepare, the Soviet Foreign Ministry drafted a directive to its delegation that described in detail the kind of government they must create for Korea and how it should be established.
The key was Moscow’s definition of “democratic.” For the USSR, democracy meant social democracy, not political democracy. A country was “democratic” if it divided its economic resources on an equal basis, not if its people freely elected their government. The Korean parties to be labelled “democratic” were therefore those that advocated land reform and other socialist policies, and it was only such parties that the Joint Commission should consult to create a Provisional Government.
After identifying which parties and social organizations were “democratic,” the Joint Commission must make recommendations about the Provisional Government’s structure and organizational principles, its political platform and personnel. “The Provisional Korean Democratic Government will be formed from representatives of the democratic parties and social organizations.” Its ministerial posts should be divided equally between the candidates put forth by the democratic parties and social organizations of North and South Korea and those candidates should be persons, “devoted to the Korean people, who are loyal to the allies and who have proven their readiness to fight for a democratic Korea.”
The Foreign Ministry then laid out the tasks the new government must fulfill. Since Moscow’s highest goal was to protect itself from a resurgence of Japanese militarism, the first task of the Korean Provisional Government must be the “final liquidation of the remnants of the former Japanese rule in the political and economic life of Korea, the struggle against the reactionary anti-democratic elements within the country, forbidding the activity of pro-fascist and anti-democratic parties, organizations, and groups.”
Second, the Provisional Government must create “local self-government in the whole territory of Korea through the People’s Committees, elected by the population on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret voting without discrimination by sex or religion.” To satisfy American concerns, the new government should pledge to secure “political freedom: freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion, activity of democratic parties, professional unions and other democratic organizations,” as well as “the inviolability of persons and domiciles, securing through law the private property of citizens.”
Moscow had for many years received extensive reports on conditions in Korea from its consulate in Seoul. Based on this information, the directive specified that the new government must replace the legislative and judicial organs established by the Japanese and must democratize Korea’s legal organs. It must introduce “universal free and obligatory schooling in the native language; broadening the network of primary, secondary, and tertiary schools,” and develop Korean culture, as well as “agriculture, industry, and transport to raise the people’s wellbeing.”
The Provisional Government must also carry out the kind of land reform already underway in the North. It should confiscate land “belonging to the Japanese and to Koreans who are traitors of the people, as well as large landowners,” end “the fulfillment system, and transfer all confiscated land without pay to Korean peasants.” It must confiscate “irrigation systems belonging to the owners of confiscated land and transfer them without payment to the Korean state.” It must “nationalize large-scale industry, banks, oil, forests, and railroad transport belonging to Japanese and Korean monopolies.” The directive noted that “small enterprises and immovable property that formerly belonged to Japanese residents in Korea and was officially seized by Koreans with the approval of the Soviet and American commands after the capitulation of the Japanese armed forces will not be subject to nationalization.”
Finally, the Provisional Government must create a “network of special schools for the preparation of cadres for the state apparatus, industry, transport, communications, agriculture, education, culture, and health care. Enumerating policies that would soon be carried out in the North, the directive ordered that the Provisional Government must ”establish control over market prices, struggle against speculation and usury, establish a single just tax system, introduce a progressive tax, introduce an 8-hour working day for workers and employees and a 6-hour working day for children from 13-16 years of age, forbid exploitation of labor of children under 13 years of age, provide job security for workers and employees, and establish a minimum wage, social insurance and labor protection.” It must also “broaden the network of medical institutions, struggle against epidemic diseases, and secure free medical care for the poor.”
In the next post, we will examine the Foreign Ministry’s instructions for how the Joint Commission would consult with “democratic parties and social organizations” and how these provisions were in fact used to prevent the creation of a provisional government.
[Source: 13 March 1946. Lozovsky to Molotov. Draft directive to the Soviet delegation at the Joint Soviet/American Commission on the Formation of a Provisional Korean democratic government. Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Fond 18, Opis 8, Delo 79, Papka 6, Str. 4-11. The final draft is found in Fond 07, Opis 11, Delo 280, Papka 18.]
This page is synchronized from the post: ‘(Korean War)The Division of Korea, 1945-1948. Post #18’