by Prof. Kathryn Weathersby
When the London Conference of Allied Foreign Ministers opened in September, Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov put the Korean issue to the side while he pressed for Moscow’s first priority – securing some control over the occupation of Japan. Since Stalin assumed that Japan would rearm and again threaten the Soviet Far East, probably in conjunction with the United States, he considered it of utmost importance to guarantee as strong a voice as possible in shaping occupation policy for the defeated enemy. Molotov therefore continued to raise the issue, even after Secretary of State Robert Byrnes refused to include it on the conference agenda.
In a statement to the conference, the Soviet foreign minister argued that since the responsibility for the occupation of Japan rested on the four allied powers, the administration of the occupation should not be carried out solely by the United States. He proposed that an Allied Control Council for Japan be established in Tokyo, chaired by the United States, with representatives of each of the four allied powers. Despite Molotov’s efforts, however, the conference agreed only to establish a Far Eastern Advisory Commission, whose members would have far less power than Moscow sought.
Stalin refused to give up on the Japan issue. In correspondence with the Americans through the month of October, the Soviet leader tried a new tactic, arguing that a Control Commission should be established similar to the one set up for Romania. General MacArthur would have the final voice on this commission, just as the Soviet commander in Romania had the final voice as chairman of the Romanian Control Commission. Stalin failed to get a satisfactory agreement from the Americans, and negotiations continued through November.
One effect of this diplomatic standoff with the US over Japan policy was that the commander of Soviet forces in Korea, General Chistiakov, refused to negotiate with the American command in the South over the serious problems created by the division of the country. Since Soviet occupation authorities had sealed off their zone, coal mined in the North could not reach the South and agricultural products produced in the South could not reach the North. Eighty-five percent of the electricity used in Korea was produced in the North, while two-thirds of the population lived in the southern zone. Stopping the flow of power from the North to the South therefore caused severe power shortages in the southern zone. There were also disruptions in transportation, mail delivery, and many other areas of daily life. In mid-September a group of American officers visited Soviet headquarters in Pyongyang to invite General Chistiakov to a conference to discuss such problems. The Soviet command received the Americans cordially, but they did not respond to the invitation to open negotiations on these urgent issues.
It seems that American intransigence on Japan led Moscow to abandon the idea of using trusteeship over Korea as a bargaining chip for further territorial gains. Instead, while negotiations over the occupation of Japan continued through the fall of 1945, Soviet occupation authorities in northern Korea took steps to create a separate governing structure for their zone. Thus, whatever the eventual outcome of Moscow’s diplomatic efforts, the Soviet Union would ensure that at least the northern half of Korea would become a reliable buffer against future attack from Japan, as well as a readily available source of valuable economic resources.
The next post will examine the type of governing structure the Soviets created in the North, before we turn to the very different steps the Americans took as they began their occupation of the South.
This page is synchronized from the post: ‘(Korean War History) The Division of Korea, 1945-1948, Post # 6’