Prof. Kathryn Weathersby
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As the Korean issue developed in the summer of 1947, the authorities in the North understood that the establishment of a separate government in the South would be harmful to the interests of Korean Communists as well as of Moscow. Both naturally wanted the Soviet-backed proto-government in the North to extend its jurisdiction over the rest of the peninsula. While discussions in the Joint Commission remained deadlocked, the political and economic chaos in the southern zone gave the Soviets and Korean Communists hope that they could gain control of the South through political subversion.
Scholars do not yet have full documentation of Soviet support for espionage and agitation in the South during this period, but the evidence we do have indicates that such “active measures” increased as the US moved toward abandoning the Joint Commission in August 1947. In response to these activities, General Hodge ordered the police to arrest communist leaders and seize their documents. He also closed leftist newspapers, proclaiming that “the time for politeness, accepted as weakness by the Communists and by the Russians, is ended.”
At the same time, American officials moved forward with the plans for a political settlement outlined in the last post. They informed General Shtykov that the US would unilaterally draft a report on the situation in Korea if the Soviets refused to participate in compiling a joint summary. To try to stop, or at least delay, such a move, on August 23 Foreign Minister Molotov accepted the American proposal for a joint report. Moscow had not softened its position on consultations, however. Molotov reiterated the earlier position that Korean parties in the Anti-Trusteeship Committee would not be consulted unless they renounced their opposition to the Moscow Agreement.
Molotov also condemned Hodge’s recent arrests and imprisonments of leftists as “abnormal and inadmissible.” In return, the head of the US delegation to the Joint Commission, Major General Albert E. Brown, accused Shtykov of exploiting a false issue to distract from Moscow’s refusal to consult with all legitimate political groups. In an attempt to unmask Soviet hypocrisy, Brown offered to release the imprisoned leftists if the Soviets would free political prisoners in the North and agree to broad consultation at the Joint Commission.
Three days later Undersecretary of State Robert A. Lovett wrote to Molotov accusing the Soviet Union of violating the agreement it had concluded with Secretary of State Marshall. Koreans who were members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee had signed the required pledge of cooperation and had not agitated against the Moscow Agreement, but the Soviet delegation still refused to allow them to participate in consultations. Since continued discussion at the Joint Commission would be useless, Lovett called for a four-power conference (adding China and Great Britain) to convene in Washington on September 9 to consider the joint report on progress toward a political settlement. He explained that the US would propose a plan for Korea’s unification and economic recovery.
On September 4 the State Department received Molotov’s reply which rejected the US proposal. The Soviet foreign minister accused the US of blocking the creation of a democratic government in Korea. Moreover, since British and Chinese participation in the trusteeship would mean that Moscow would be outvoted 3 to 1, Molotov rejected this suggestion. President Truman responded to Molotov’s letter by instructing Secretary of State Marshall to address the United Nations General Assembly on September 9 and place the Korean issue on its agenda.
Many scholars have criticized President Truman’s decision to turn the Korean question over to the UN as a desire to get rid of an unwanted burden. In the next post, we will look more closely at the actual American motives, which, predictably, involved a broad range of concerns about the evolving international situation.
[Sources: This post relies on my article “Making Foreign Policy Under Stalin: The Case of Korea,” in Niels Erik Rosenfeldt, Bent Jensen and Erik Kulavig, eds., Mechanisms of Power in the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); and James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (University of Hawaii Press).]
This page is synchronized from the post: ‘(Korean War History) Post #36. The Division of Korea, 1945-1948’